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The Birth of the United States of America
in the Eighteenth-Century World History
KIHIRA Eisaku＊
The main theme of this symposium is to re-examine the history and present
conditions of the American empire in the light of a new theory of empire recently
proposed by two distinguished Marxist scholars, Italian philosopher Antonio
Negri and American economist Michael Hardt; their work, Empire, was
published in 2000.
1
In advance, I must make an apology for my insufficient
understanding of their new thesis, however. I will sincerely appreciate it if the
audience is tolerant enough to my presentation unfit for today’s main theme.
What I present today is a historical interpretation of the birth of the United
States that won her independence, separating from the British Empire in the late
eighteenth century. First, I will evaluate the new thesis presented by Negri and
Hardt as far as I understand it. Then, I will explain my idea of what the creation
of the new nation in North America meant in the eighteenth century world history.
I shall pay special attention to the fact that all European powers were not a little
empire-oriented in the eighteenth century.
I
Again I must confess that, mainly because of my lack of knowledge, I have
not completely grasped the new thesis Negri and Hardt presented about empire.
But, I might be allowed to explain the reason why I feel pretty uncomfortable
with their arguments. It concerns their central thesis that a totally new kind of
empire has emerged in the world following the 1970s: that is, a global empire
which does not have any territory and national organizations. They argue that
such a worldwide empire is characteristic of a new stage in world history to the
extent that it has no limit in spatial location and is completely flexible in structure
beyond the present nation-state system. It might be said that their empire is
composed of structural ingredients totally different from those of historical
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empires.
Metaphorically, such a new empire displays itself as a system of financial
networks freely to invest a mass of capital, in the short-term as well as in long-
term, in any nation or wherever in the world. Negri and Hardt insist that activities
of the new empire are no longer bound by outside political elements, due to
administrative deregulations that most nations introduced after the international
economic slump and competition of the 1970s. The International Monetary Fund
and the World Bank might be ranked as sub-institutions of the new empire in that
they operate effectively to assist the worldwide transmission of massive capital
flows to and from financial centers. Anyway, such immense funds handled by the
global financial network penetrate everywhere in the world to seek profit and to
transform a variety of human activities, traditional as well as modern, natural
resources, and even the environment into capitalistic transactions. Negri and
Hardt argue that an amorphous power has emerged as an invisible structure for
controlling the movement of world-wide capital, which might be called a new
empire.
This empire is so powerful beyond what any modern nations in the world are
able to control that national sovereignty no longer remains substantially supreme,
as being placed in a relationship subsidiary to the new empire. Negri and Hardt
organize their conclusions as follows. First, they assume that the modern nation-
state system in the world already disappeared by the end of the twentieth century
so that all nations have lost complete sovereignty. Then, they lead their way into
concluding that even the American empire has already faded away into the
historical past.
So much for Negri and Hardt’s argument about new empire. Certainly any
person in the world following the 1980s has had a strong feeling that the modern
nation-state system experienced dramatic change due to rapid globalization. For
example, worldwide currents in capital and information have made the political
and economic borders of present nations so weak as to cause even a parochial
individual in a small country to become insolvent due to a sudden change in the
world economic trends. Social policies have become disabled in many areas such
as employment policies, so that all national systems are struck with the widening
internal disparities in income. There is no doubt that Negri and Hardt have
formed a new Marxist concept of worldwide empire from their sharp analysis of
both the progress in information technologies and the consequent changing
economic situations in the whole world following the 1980s.
Therefore, I am pleased to acknowledge their thesis as a remarkable model
with which Marxist social scientists have interpreted the present world
dynamically. Nevertheless I cannot help but feel a strong doubt about their
argument from one viewpoint. The question is concerned with why they use the
word “empire” in describing the new system they image in the present world; for
historians have delineated empire as a type of expansive and considerably
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despotic state particularly in the pre-modern and modern world; and, for all
international structure in the modern world has been built on none other than the
state system since the sixteenth century while capitalism became global. From
the view of political and social historians, empires in the early-modern and
modern world have been characterized as attempts for territorial expansion as
well as for exclusive control for pursuing particular interests, which were repeated
in the competitive world situations on the basis of territorial states.
Certainly, definitions of empire and imperialism are still in controversy, but,
for example, let me quote a comment by prominent political scientist M. W.
Doyle in his famous work, Empires. “Empire is a relationship, formal or informal,
in which one state controls the effective political sovereignty of another political
society. It can be achieved by force, by political collaboration, by economic,
social, or cultural dependence. Imperialism is simply the process or policy of
establishing or maintaining an empire.”
2
Along his argument, we might well
understand a workable framework of historical empires to be a relationship in
which particular states have exercised hierarchical control toward another
political society by force, or by economic, social, or cultural dependence. In
short, it might be argued that, if we take a concept of empire from the context of
modern world history, such empires should be none other than state power
authorities.
3
In the following, I will carry on a discussion with the assumption
that historical empires should be described as state power that compels another
political society to be subordinate.
Let me briefly sum up modern world history after the beginning of the
sixteenth century from a point of view of the rise and fall of empire. In Europe,
all historical empires emerged as international structures in the context of fierce
military and territorial conflicts among several states. The Spanish Empire was
the first to reach across the Atlantic Ocean to extend control to the newly
discovered American continent and its native inhabitants by violent force. With
the rise of that Empire, the European international structure, while it was still
called the European State System, was gradually transformed into a worldwide
empire-oriented system in expanding its dominance outside Europe, particularly
to the Atlantic ocean and the American continent. In fact, both the British Empire
and the French Empire which took the place of the Spanish Empire in the
eighteenth century aimed as well to control Atlantic commerce and to dominate
certain American territories and their people from the outside. The two empires
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had several common distinctions. First, they dramatically expanded their state
administration with military force so as to be defined as fiscal-military states.
Second, their authorities controlled the empires as having clear differences
between their own countries, as centers, and peripheral regions in order to enlarge
the wealth and power of their centers. These characteristics were sustained by
both empires until the mid twentieth century while the British Empire expanded
her control from the Atlantic world to Asia and Africa.
The above is a standard, even banal description of modern history from the
perspective of European empires. But, anyway the empires, as they appeared in
modern history, have featured themselves as definitely expanding state power
with its forceful organizations, whether the state was a nation-state or an absolute
monarchy, which aimed to control the political sovereignty of another political
society in the framework of competitive state system. And it is worth mentioning
that the United States won her independence from the British Empire in such
empire-oriented European international relations.
From a historical perspective it was inevitable that the new American
Republic had a tendency to expand its territorial control outside, as much as other
contemporary nations did in the European State System. It deserves to be
remarked, however, that the creation of the new republic was achieved through
resistance not only in a social movement but in political theory against a genuine
empire, the British Empire that had just defeated France in the Seven-Year War in
the mid eighteenth century. The fact that their independence movement gave the
new republic a rare modernity beyond simple historical recurrence of an empire-
oriented state might well be emphasized.
First of all, the United States could not be organized on other than the
principle of popular sovereignty that theoretically promised equal protection of
the laws to all citizens. With the institutionalization of that principle into the
federal republic, she organized a modern representative system and presidency in
order to unify a variety of people from top social leaders to small farmers, except
slaves. Such a modern orientation toward a nation-state never meant that the
United States after her independence did not greedily expand her territory as
much as all contemporary European empires did; rather, expansion of the United
States was most aggressive in the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, it also
encouraged the United States to restrain herself from controlling the effective
sovereignty of another political society hierarchically from outside.
In my opinion, the coexistence of hesitancy to control others with drastic
impulse toward territorial expansion, as well as the modernity toward popular
sovereignty, might be the clear distinctions that the United States had had in being
created at the end of the eighteenth century. In the following, I will more deeply
describe an origin of the modernity as attached to the birth of the United States
and, then, how that modernity took shape in the government system of the new
Republic. The focus will be on the struggle of the thirteen colonies in North
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America against the British Empire during the period of c. 1764-1787.
II
It was the radical gentlemen and intellectuals of the thirteen colonies that
began to pick up the doctrine of popular sovereignty in resistance movements
against the British Parliament in the late 1760s. At first, they said that Parliament
was not representative of the people of the colonies when the colonies had already
organized their own assemblies through popular elections. Such arguments as
having the right to organize their own legislatures was nothing but an embryo of
the principle of popular sovereignty, because they contained the assumption that
each of the colonial assemblies was equal in status to the British Parliament.
Under the influence of such assertions for equality and the right to organize their
own representative system, the radical leaders of the American Revolution would
unify complex resistance movements into one force eventually to lead their way
to independence from the British Empire and the building of a new Republic.
4
Incidentally, in the same period the radical elites of the colonies also started to
assert that the people of any political society have the right to organize their local
communities for political autonomy, the so-called municipal right, and that
municipal rights should be assured for all British peoples in line with their natural
rights. Their argument was developed along the scheme that such communities
had special features in their regions so that each political society might well be
divided into several equal municipal units. The municipal rights’ argument, while
it had originally been proposed as a theory of resistance against hegemony of the
British Empire, was eventually to unfold itself into a particular thought of
federalism in the new Republic during the late 1780s.
As is well known, the thirteen states composing the Confederation of the U.S.
before and after the Paris Peace Treaty of 1783 were so sovereign as if to control
independently their own territory; power and authority of the Confederation
Congress was strictly restricted, even in the field of foreign relations. Several
groups of political elites such as James Madison and Alexander Hamilton soon
decided to make a more concrete union of the United States under the U.S.
Constitution in order to overcome deadly conflicts among the thirteen states and
so on. Although many models of government might be open, Madison, Hamilton
and others adopted into the central government system an unprecedented model of
federalism that each state would keep municipal right for local autonomy while
the federal government as a unified authority should be organized distinctively
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with sovereignty. Early in 1788, Hamilton explained in The Federalist Papers
that the federal government could share sovereignty with state governments to the
extent that both governments coexisted based on popular elections and that their
powers and functions should be quite distinguished in their own ways from each
other. Hamilton also wrote that all state governments under the U.S.
Constitution, large or small in space or population, would be equal in each having
two Senators in the federal government.
5
In short, the federalism of the new Republic was defined as a characteristic
system that state governments having equal status to each other were given a
powerful local autonomy while all of them were ranked as municipal corporations
under the authority of the national government. Importantly as well, the people of
the United States, even if living in a frontier currently restricted in local
autonomy, were promised to have their municipal rights to organize a new state
with a certain growth in regional population. That is why Madison asserted in
The Federalist Papers that the new Republic, even if it should extend in territory
beyond what it was, would be able to preserve its features as a republic in being
dually composed of states as well as of people.
Such were the contours of popular sovereignty and federalism asserted at the
drafting of the U.S. Constitution in the late 1780s. It is worth noting that the
background, in which these principles were developed by the political elites such
as Hamilton and Madison, had been so complex that they had successively to
respond to several critical situations with a variety of anxieties in order to get
consensus for the establishment of a new united republic. From a historical
perspective, it might be interesting to analyze in what way and how well the
political elites got such a political consensus from people. Let me trace briefly
the political and social changes in the period of 1764 to 1788.
Historian Edmond Morgan has once described how the principle of popular
sovereignty was “discovered” as a political thought during the English Revolution
in the seventeenth century.
6
He has wrote as follows; in the middle of the Puritan
Revolution the radical gentlemen and the nobles in Parliament (later Whigs),
although they should be classified as the rulers in the whole England society, hold
up high a doctrine of popular sovereignty in order to legitimate their political and
religious struggle against the Stuart monarchy as if the entire people might rise up
against absolutism. He has also argued that those gentlemen and the titled hold in
mind the objective of containing as much as possible claims such as broadening
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fundamental human rights and suffrage that the Levelers demanded in criticizing
the aristocratic exclusivity of Parliament. In short, the principle of popular
sovereignty in English political history was a fiction created by the dominant
elites in disguising themselves as representatives of people. In conclusion,
Morgan has shown a wide historical perspective that the theory of popular
sovereignty was handed down to intellectuals in British North American colonies
as well as to British elites until the late eighteenth century.
7
Let me argue about the historical structure and dynamism of the American
Revolution with reference to the Morgan thesis. Resistance movements of the
colonies against the British Parliament intensified just after the end of the Seven-
Year War, as is mentioned above. During the war, colonial militias and
inhabitants had fought under the command of the British regular army, eventually
to defeat the French empire in North America, particularly in Canada. Therefore
they, on one hand, celebrated the victory in war making their territory
tremendously expand in North America. On the other hand, the war ironically
made worse than ever the conflicts between the authorities of the British Empire
and the colonial elites in regard to how to control colonial territory.
8
In
retrospect, the most important aspect of the American Revolution was concerned
with power struggles between both elites on either side of the Atlantic Ocean in
controlling the newly expanded British colonies in North America. Furthermore,
it also deserves to be mentioned that it was the political and social elites in the
colonies that managed to take the leadership through the entire period of the
Revolution from independence to the framing of the U.S. Constitution. The
American Revolution was conservative in the sense that the existent power elites
and intellectuals among colonial societies constantly controlled its movement; the
influential political thoughts and appeals were mostly furnished by those elites.
However, many historical explorations have also demonstrated that colonial
societies during the Revolution were suffering from great social and economic
transformations with tensions from the mid eighteenth century; economic
activities within the colonies became active through the rapid expansion of
internal commerce and transatlantic trade as well as the development of
agricultural productivity; urbanization increased and meanwhile a stratification of
society in terms of property and status also became noticeable in all the colonies
from aristocratic gentlemen to landless farmers and the urban poor.
9
Growth in
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the population including immigrants made colonial society more diverse, but also
social conflicts broke out; for example, in the manner that competition for
acquiring land became more and more intensive. Some historians have pointed
out that the western frontier near the Allegheny Mountains area experienced
uncontrolled social disorders such as confusion about land ownership and bloody
fights between squatters and the Indian tribes.
Most importantly, the American Revolution occurred in the middle of this
social upheaval within colonies. Although there is no doubt that the social and
political elites kept holding the initiative in the independence struggle against the
mother country, their leadership meanwhile had to include at least two strategies
to keep the resistance movement going. On one hand, they needed to mobilize a
variety of common people and their diverse energies as much as possible into the
resistance. On the other hand, they had to maintain discipline of these masses in
order to secure the establishment of a new political structure under their initiative.
Without control of the masses, the colonial elites could not have taken the place
of power elites of the mother country following independence; so it is no wonder
that the revolutionary elites in the American Revolution always considered the
flexible social situations and social conflicts in the colonies with anxiety. It
meant that their doctrine of popular sovereignty, while externally being taken as a
theory of resistance against the British Empire, would have another implicit
objective to consolidate the unspecified mass of people internally under their
leadership. If they succeeded in creating the U.S. Constitution in 1787, it proved
that a kind of consensus for recognizing a new political system under the
leadership of elites had been born in American society during the so-called
Confederation period.
In summing up, the American Revolution proved to be a complex process in
which a political consensus, or an understanding, was created between the
revolutionary elites and the mass of people to build a new political establishment
called the United States of America. Such a process naturally involved many
political concessions made by both sides (although a delicate analysis of how
concessions were negotiated is another discussion). And, the doctrine of popular
sovereignty was none other than a political fiction, or a strategic political idea,
proposed originally by the colonial elites during the American Revolution,
through which they maintained their leadership in the movement to take the place
of power authorities of the British Empire and also to establish a new Republic.
However, as a historical reality such fiction was obliged to look like truth in
the American Revolution more than in the English Revolution because the new
American republic came into being under intensive social transformations. As
historian Jack Rakove has indicated, American revolutionaries, particularly
federal elites aiming to establish a new national constitution, could not have
gained consent from a variety of colonial masses without striking a pose to be
representative of the whole people not only in language but also in the substance
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That is why, for example, remarkably large power was
given initially to the legislatures of the new states in their constitutions established
just after independence; although all of them would be revised within twenty
years. The same logic explains why the strong municipal rights of new states
were incorporated as one of the most important principles of the U.S.
Constitution.
Certainly, the states’ rights under the U.S. Constitution partly derived from the
situation that former states had been totally autonomous following the Declaration
of Independence. More importantly, however, most of the revolutionary elites
were also to accept a doctrine that political powers must be geographically
dispersed as much as possible throughout the whole territory to be representative
of the interests of local communities. In consequence, the new republic, the
United States, promised that states as municipal organizations would increase in
number beyond the original thirteen states in proportion to population growth or
territorial expansion in the future. New states could be organized rather
voluntarily in the western area or in other special cases such as Vermont. Also it
was assured that the states under the federal system would be principally equal in
status so that even the poor inhabitants in the western frontier were able to obtain
equal political status in the future with the increase of regional population. In
short, the new Republic was framed in such a manner as if to make the political
idea of popular sovereignty come into reality. That idea might be still nothing
more than a political fiction in long-term history, but, nevertheless, there is no
doubt that it was an important feature the United States addressed herself to in her
birth in the late eighteenth century.
Now, some political turning points in the American Revolution, where
consensus to establish a new constitutional republic gradually became concrete in
1764-1789, might be indicated: although these descriptions could only be general
in this short essay.
First, needless to say, the Declaration of Independence had basic significance
as a starting point toward making a new political structure. The Declaration had
an objective of mobilizing an unspecified number of people in the colonies to the
war of independence when holding up ideas of a social contract and popular
sovereignty as an ultimate ideal. But, the Declaration only showed a temporary
political perspective that any likely confederation as an alliance among the
thirteen states would stand out to secure the natural rights of former colonial
peoples under the social contract; it lacked a vision of making a consolidated
federal state. We might say that the political vision of the revolutionary elites
was still in the middle of searching for something.
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Second, the next milestone for the new republic was the conclusion of the
Paris Peace Treaty of 1783 that not only confirmed independence for the thirteen
states under the Confederation but also presented to the U.S. Confederation a vast
territory stretching to the Mississippi River. It is well known that the territorial
problem was continually discussed almost five years in the Confederation
Congress. Although suffering from many conflicts, the Congress eventually
came to an agreement by 1784: first, western territory beyond the Allegheny
Mountains should not be allotted to the existent thirteen states but be kept under
control of the Confederacy, and, secondly, almost fifteen new states in equality
with existent states would be organized there in the future. The core of the
agreement was that the Confederation had developed a new vision that it might be
transformed into a more unified federal nation with sovereignty which governed
flexible territory on its own. As historian Peter Onuf has indicated, the federal
elites turned out to consolidate their ascendancy through such an agreement
holding up a dynamic and expansive conception of American federalism. In the
late 1780s, they began to make preparations to transform the U.S. Confederation
into a new type of Republic in line with the agreement of how to manage the
western territory. It resulted in the adoption of the Northwest Ordinance by the
Confederation Congress in 1787.
11
Third, the final stage in the American Revolution was nothing but the
Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia from May to September 1787. As
historian Gordon Wood has made clear, the Convention included a clear
conservative objective, on one hand, of establishing national authority with
executive power by which the existing elites expected to curb social disorder and
upheaval frequently found in several states.
12
The government structure the
Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia deliberately created was designed to
become a strong system of control on a national scale with which the federal elites
could keep the leadership in federal politics as well as in state politics. However,
on the other hand, the Convention was equally bound to work out some type of
national government structure along the principle of popular sovereignty as well
as to incorporate municipal rights.
Under the initiative of James Madison, the Convention eventually agreed to
organize a new Congress consisting of two houses, the Senate and the House of
Representatives that would be different from each other in their delegates and
functions. The Senate would be composed of two delegates, Senators, from each
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state, implicitly meaning the reassurance of municipal rights incorporated as a
principle; the House of Representatives would be composed of representatives
who were allotted to each state in proportion to its population and furthermore
were elected through direct elections by the people.
Historian Morgan has indicated that it was articles of direct election by the
people for the House of Representatives that were the core of the U.S.
Constitution drafted in 1787. With this stipulation, the federal elites could claim
that they represent the people even when they were elected easily with deferential
authority in each district; on the other hand, the people would convince
themselves that they were consolidated in a new federal state as a whole with
sovereignty. When the “people” were thus created along with a building of the
government system, the United States Constitution gradually gained political
legitimacy as the most republican achievement in the eighteenth century political
affairs. In terms of Morgan’s thesis, the drafting of the U.S. Constitution might




One could say that the United States was created as a new type of Republic in
the closing period of the eighteenth century. Certainly, at that time she was
neither a democratic nation, nor should have been designated as a nation-state in
that she legitimated slavery to such an extent that slaves accounted for about one
sixth of her total population. However, it is also undeniable that the federal
nation incorporated two modern political principles, popular sovereignty and
municipal rights, into the center of its constitutional system. Particularly the
latter principle institutionalized as federalism had a long-term influence on the
development of the United States, for the nation at that moment had a vast
unoccupied territory to the west and even had an ambition to extend its
sovereignty beyond what it was. While its territory was expected to expand, the
principle of municipal rights promised that any likely new state from the western
territory would gain equality with established states in the federal system.
What the concept of “modern” means in world history is not defined clearly
by any historians yet. But the federal system the United States incorporated at her
birth had a certain potential of restraining the momentum for legal discrimination
and control over other citizens within its national boundaries, as it was opposed to
territorial differentiation between center and peripheries. It may be reasonable
that one finds therein a kind of modernity, or universality, implanted in the
political structure of the United States.
Finally, let me make a few comments on the theme of today’s symposium, a
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reexamination of the United States in the light of empire, which has been not
analyzed at all in my argument.
As a historian, I would never deny that the United States by nature had some
impulse to become a great hegemonic power which might be called an empire.
Even in the nineteenth century the United States repeatedly made tremendous
territorial expansions, for example, by waging wars such as the American-
Mexican War. Meanwhile she constantly adopted elimination policies to the
natives. Also, racial segregation for black citizens became legalized in the
southern states in the late nineteenth century even after slavery had been
abolished in the Civil War. It would be inappropriate to describe the
development of the United States as not including an ingredient of empire-
building, such as control over others. And, the economic activities of the United
States initiated by business and financial interests might be figured as
tremendously aggressive toward outside world. But those are not to deny that the
principles of popular sovereignty and municipal rights incorporated in her
constitutional system operated partly, though not completely, to check both
political trends toward legalizing control over other citizens and societies and the
political impulse for building empire in the world.
That the United States and her political system were created with a kind of
modernity in so complicated and even contradictory historical situations is worth
noting again. The core of such complicated situations was the relationship
between the political and social elites and the common people. If my presentation
today could be regarded as preliminary research to analyze these complicated
situations, I am very pleased.
NANZAN REVIEW OF AMERICAN STUDIES 35 / 201382
